Analytic Memo 8: Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) for ISIS

by Dack Anderson, Lead Security Consultant

Image source: Office of Naval Research, US Navy

As part of my academic journey at Pikes Peak State College, I had the opportunity to study ESA4010: Terrorism Threat & Risk Analysis in 2022, a critical course that deepened my understanding of terrorism-related threats, emergency response strategies, and analytical methods. Under the guidance of Professor Woody Boyd, I conducted extensive research using structured assessment models to analyze whether ISIS remains a threat to the United States.

This eighth annex explores the Islamic State’s command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure, examining how the group maintains operational cohesion across decentralized affiliates, leverages digital platforms for recruitment and coordination, and adapts its intelligence practices to exploit vulnerabilities in unstable regions. The memo highlights how ISIS’s ideological appeal and technological agility continue to challenge conventional counterterrorism frameworks.

Key Findings

Brian Steed, in ISIS: An Introduction and Guide to the Islamic State (2016), describes ISIS as a post-state actor, one that seeks to establish a state outside the Western model and stands alone in its fight against the world. Steed emphasizes that ISIS does not depend on modern infrastructure like roads, schools, or traditional telecom networks. It will exploit these systems when useful, but its operational model doesn’t require them. ISIS’s command structure is rooted in collective identity: religion, family, and community. These identities are repackaged through propaganda to foster a worldview that sees outsiders as hostile. As Dolatabadi & Seifabadi (2017) note, “the spread of the fundamentalist identity in the modern world can be considered as an immediate outcome of globalization.”

Control over occupied territories is maintained through fear: mass executions, enslavement of women, and crucifixions (McCants, 2015). Yet one of ISIS’s most potent tools is ideological conviction. While most Muslims reject the Islamic State, the group has successfully appealed to a subset of Sunni youth (particularly young men) by offering a sense of purpose and adventure (Bynam, 2016). Despite losing senior leaders to counterterrorism operations and rival factions, ISIS continues to operate through global affiliates known as wilayat (“provinces”). These groups remain tightly aligned with ISIS leadership and serve as force multipliers, expanding the group’s reach and lethality (Wilson Center, 2021; Bynam, 2016).

ISIS’s communications strategy is internet-centric. Social media platforms like Twitter have been used to coordinate attacks, such as the 2015 Curtis Culwell Center shooting in Texas. In developing nations, where internet access is increasingly common, ISIS exploits digital channels to recruit youth and disseminate propaganda (Harrison, 2018).

Meaning of Findings

The instability of governments hosting ISIS affiliates, combined with rising internet penetration, creates fertile ground for radicalization. ISIS doesn’t just issue orders; it cultivates willing participants. This distinction is critical to understanding its C3I capabilities:

• Command: Exercising authority to achieve strategic goals

• Control: Monitoring and correcting operational activity

• Communications: Linking tactical and strategic units effectively

• Intelligence: Gathering, analyzing, and distributing actionable information

  
  

ISIS’s adaptability, persistence, and decentralized structure make it a formidable adversary. Its ability to evolve and embed itself within fractured societies complicates counterterrorism efforts.

Assessment of Findings

ISIS can be disrupted, but only through a comprehensive strategy. Al-Qaeda’s own provincial model eventually became a liability, draining resources and undermining cohesion. ISIS may face a similar fate if its communication links with affiliates are severed. As Bynam (2016) argues, defeating ISIS requires targeting the organization holistically, not just its visible components. The West must address the root causes of its emergence and adapt counterterrorism strategies to match ISIS’s technological evolution. Breaking key links in ISIS’s C3I network, while maintaining focus on the broader ideological and structural landscape, could bring us closer to ending its global threat. Tactical victories alone won’t suffice. Strategic disruption is essential.

References:

Bynam, D. (2016). ISIS Goes Global: Fight the Islamic State by Targeting Its Affiliates. Foreign Affairs, 76-85.

Dolatabadi, A., & Seifabadi, M. S. (2017, May). Globalization, Crisis of Meaning and Emergence of the Fundamentalist Identity: The Case Study of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Retrieved from Social Studies: https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/articles/939434/ 

Harrison, S. (2018, March 22). Evolving Tech, Evolving Terror. Retrieved from Center for Strategic & International Studies: https://www.csis.org/npfp/evolving-tech-evolving-terror 

McCants, W. (2015). The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. Macmillan.

Steed, B. L. (2016). ISIS: An Introduction and Guide to the Islamic State. ABC-CLIO.

Wilson Center. (2021, December 16). U.S. Report: ISIS and Al Qaeda Threats. Retrieved from Insight & Analysis: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-report-isis-and-al-qaeda-threats